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Russellians can have a no proposition view of
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Thomas Hodgson†
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Abstract
Russellians can have a no proposition view of empty names. I will
defend this theory against the problem of meaningfulness, and show that
the theory is in general well motivated. My solution to the problem of
meaningfulness is that speakers’ judgements about meaningfulness are
tracking grammaticality, and not propositional content.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Russellianism
Some names denote objects, and some don’t; the latter are empty names. This
is a familiar observation, but it has deep philosophical consequences. Some
otherwise attractive theories of mental and linguistic content seem to cope badly
with empty names. The family of views I have in mind is Russellianism. My
project in this paper is to articulate and defend a view about empty names that
is consistent with Russellianism in its most austere form. Because I am trying
to neutralise a particular objection to Russellianism, that it cannot cope with
empty names, I won’t be arguing directly for Russellianism. I don’t think that
empty names are the only important objection to Russellianism, but here I won’t
be concerned with any others.1
The austere form of Russellianism that I endorse can be defined by the following
two theses.2
Mill The content of a proper name, if it has one, is its referent.
Russell The content of a declarative sentence, if it has one, is a structured
proposition; its constituents are the contents of the constituents of the
sentence.
I will assume that there are such things as propositions, and that they can in
principle be the contents of sentences. I will also assume that the claim that
propositions have constituents can be made sense of, although I won’t give a
theory of what that amounts to; see Keller (2013) for the problems that this idea
brings with it. For simplicity I will assume that a proposition can be perspicuously
represented as an ordered sequence of objects and properties: the proposition
that Neptune is a planet can be represented as 〈Neptune,being-a-planet〉. This
is orthodox Russellianism, as developed in e.g. Soames (1987).3
1Contemporary Russellianism has been inspired by ideas from Bertrand Russell Russell
(1938); the principle I label Russell is closest to these ideas, the one I label Mill reflects a view
of names inspired by John Stuart Mill (Mill 1889).
2These formulations are very similar to those in Braun (1993, 450).
3Problems about the metaphysics of propositions will need to be resolved eventually; for
a theory that is Russellian see King (2007), and for related views and discussion see Soames
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1.2 Empty names
I will now describe the problem for Russellian theories, following David M.
Braun’s presentation (Braun 1993, 2005). I will assume that there are in fact
empty names, and I will use one of the standard examples: ‘Vulcan’. I take it
that ‘Vulcan’ is an empty name but nothing turns on this choice of example. The
fundamental problem is that according to Mill the content of ‘Vulcan’ must be
an object that is the referent of ‘Vulcan’. But there isn’t such an object: ‘Vulcan’
doesn’t have a referent. So, by Mill, ‘Vulcan’ doesn’t have a content. By Russell,
sentence (1) has as its content a proposition with the content of ‘Vulcan’ as one
of its constituents.
(1) Vulcan is a planet.
But, by Mill, there is nothing that is the content of ‘Vulcan’, so there is no
proposition that has the content of ‘Vulcan’ as one of its constituents. So, by
Russell (1) cannot have a content.
This is not in itself a refutation of Russellianism: Mill and Russell do not entail
that ‘Vulcan’ or (1) have contents. Russellianism is a view about the sorts of
contents they would have if they had them. A stronger view, which omitted the
qualification, is possible and would be directly refuted by the existence of empty
names. But this is not the view I am defending, nor is it the one that Braun
formulates. I don’t recommend that Russellians adopt the stronger view, for
obvious reasons.
If the problem of empty names doesn’t refute Russellianism why is it a problem
at all? Why not simply endorse the consequence that ‘Vulcan’ and (1) lack
contents? That, essentially, is the response I advocate in this paper. I propose
that the Russellian can and should endorse what Braun calls the ‘no proposition
view’ (Braun 1993, 456). It is, after all, a consequence of the core Russellian
position. The view I advocate is influenced by Evans (1982) and Kripke (2013);
it is intended as a way to frame a core insight of these works in a modern
neo-Russellian setting.
As will emerge in section 2 and section 3, the two most pressing problems for the
view I want to defend are to do with the truth or otherwise of sentences such as
(1) and their meaningfulness. I will argue that the Russellian can and should
accept that no sentence containing an empty name has a truth value; although
that of course does not prevent that sentence being used to convey something
true. The main substance of this paper is my original response to the second
issue. I will accept that speakers do judge sentences such as (1) to be meaningful.
I conclude from this that such speakers’ judgements are tracking some property
other than having a propositional semantic content. The property I identify as
the target of these speakers’ judgements is grammaticality in a syntactician’s
sense. Adopting this view makes the way clear for the Russellian to adopt the
no proposition response to the problem of empty names.
(2010); Hanks (2011); King, Soames, and Speaks (2014); Hanks (2015); Soames (2015).
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2 The no proposition view
2.1 Doing without propositions
I claim that Russellians ought to accept that sentences containing empty names
do not express propositions. There are some things that a theory of this sort
cannot do. My response will be to argue that a good theory does not need to
do those things. The problem of meaningfulness is my main focus in this paper,
because I think it is a problem that requires a substantive solution and that the
Russellian can provide one.
Braun introduces the problem like this:
Suppose ‘Vulcan does not exist’ fails to express a proposition. Then
it seems to follow that it is meaningless. And therefore it is nonsense.
(Braun 1993, 451)
Braun uses the terms ‘nonsense’ and ‘meaningfulness’ here, but I don’t think
that he is trying to mark an important distinction with them. In Braun (2005)
he uses different terminology, and makes it clear with his use of the example
‘Sherlock Holmes is a detective’ that negative existentials are an inessential part
of the problem.4
The next objection is The Problem of Meaningfulness for Sentences.
If Millianism is true, then the names ‘Vulcan’ and ‘Sherlock Holmes’
have no semantic content. If a name lacks semantic content, then
sentences in which the name appears also lack semantic content.
Therefore, if Millianism is true, then sentences containing ‘Vulcan’
or ‘Sherlock Holmes’ have no semantic content. If a sentence has
no semantic content, then ordinary speakers will judge that it is
not meaningful. But ordinary speakers think that many sentences
containing these names are meaningful, for instance, the sentences
‘Vulcan does not exist’ and ‘Sherlock Holmes is a detective’. So it
seems, once again, that Millianism is incorrect. (Braun 2005, 597)
(emphasis in original)
An important feature of this formulation is that the judgements of ordinary
speakers are a key part of the objection to Russellianism. The objection is not
that these sentences must have propositions as semantic contents but that, if
they do not, then the judgements of speakers that they are meaningful will be left
unexplained. This way of putting the problem, described there as ‘The Intuition
Problem’, is also found in Reimer (2001b, 491).5 That speakers do make these
judgements is, of course, an empirical claim which could be investigated by
psychologists and might turn out to be mistaken or at least incomplete. I share
Braun and Marga Reimer’s assessment that these are the judgements speakers
make and that they ought to be accommodated.
4Braun uses ‘Millianism’ to refer to Russellianism (Mill & Russell).
5I use the term ‘judgement’ rather than ‘intuition’ in my own presentation.
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2.2 Meaningfulness
2.2.1 Names
I propose that the Russellian should accept the claim that ‘Vulcan’ does not
have a content. On the Russellian theory this follows immediately from the fact
that ‘Vulcan’ is empty. So, the issue that arises is whether there is any reason
to think that this is an objectionable result.
The idea would be that ‘Vulcan’ must have a content because only then can
something that the theory needs to explain be explained. The task for someone
developing this objection is to identify this missing explanandum. For the moment
I will consider only properties that the name might have in isolation; properties
of sentences containing the name will be discussed in subsubsection 2.2.2.
One possibility is that names cannot be individuated except in terms of referents.
This might be thought to follow from some theories of the identity of names. For
example, those theories that appeal to chains of transmission going back to the
initial baptism of some object, see Cumming (2016) for a survey and references.
Names would then be individuated by the object (and chain of transmission),
but this principle of individuation cannot be applied to an empty name.
Whatever the merits of such a view it cannot be used as the basis of an objection
to Russellianism because it effectively rejects the possibility of empty names; it
does so in a way that is reminiscent of Russell’s own solution to the problem i.e. by
denying that a name can enter the language without a form of acquaintance
with a referent (Russell 1911). The theoretical role of acquaintance in Russell’s
theory and its neo-Russellian descendants, who are more liberal about what is
needed for acquaintance, is complex. Furthermore, some philosophers who are
attracted to the idea of individuating names in terms of chains of transmission
have developed accounts that allow for empty names, e.g. Donnellan (1974);
Kaplan (1990); Cappelen (1999); Hawthorne and Lepore (2011).
Another set of properties of names can be accounted for without content. The
properties I have in mind are those that might be called grammatical. An example
would be the data that motivates binding theory such as the observation that in
(2) the two occurrences of ‘Conor’ may not corefer.
(2) Conor likes Conor.
These are properties that might be considered part of the meaning of a name.
But, they are typically explained as part of a theory that is explicitly internalistic:
standard syntax textbooks, e.g. Carnie (2013), do not assign contents to names in
order to explain the observation. This internalism is explicit in Noam Chomsky’s
engagement with philosophical issues connected to the project of generative
grammar (Chomsky 2000), see also Stainton (2006); Lassiter (2008); Lassiter
(2010); Lohndal and Narita (2009); Collins (2010). Syntactic theory is internalist,
so, anything that syntactic theory explains has an internalist explanation. These
patterns of coreference are paradigmatic cases of what syntactic theory explains,
so there is no need to appeal to content.
One complication for the Russellian is that it might turn out that not all
properties of this sort are grammatical in the strict sense needed to allow for the
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invocation of internalism as a key feature of syntax. For example, Ángel Pinillos
has argued that what he calls de jure coreference is a sui generis property that
cannot be reduced to grammar (Pinillos 2011), see also Fine (2007). However,
Pinillos’s view does not invoke content either, so it could not be the basis of an
objection to the no proposition view.
2.2.2 Sentences
What about sentence level properties? Do they require content? Standard
grammatical properties won’t provide an objection against the Russellian. One
candidate property is truth. However, for the Russellian, and for at least their
Fregean opponents, truth is not a primarily a property of sentences. I will
therefore postpone discussion of truth until subsection 2.3. The other candidate
property for an explanation in terms of content is meaningfulness. The guiding
thought is that a sentence such as (1) is meaningful, but, sentence meanings are
contents i.e. propositions. So, there is a proposition that is the meaning of (1)
i.e. its content; otherwise, there is no explanation of the meaningfulness of (1).
So, the objection goes, Russellianism is refuted because it is committed to the
no proposition view.
I propose the following response to this objection. There is a property, mean-
ingfulness, that (1) has, but this does not entail that there is some proposition
that is its meaning. To make the response I am suggesting convincingly it will
be necessary to give an account of what meaningfulness is. The position I will
defend is that it is grammaticality in the syntacticians’ sense. An entity is mean-
ingful just in case it is grammatical. Grammaticality is specified internalistically,
i.e. without reference to content, so meaningfulness is too. That is an advantage
of making this identification from the Russellian’s point of view.
In a response to the problem of meaningfulness as Braun and Reimer formulate
it, what needs to be explained is speakers’ judgements about meaningfulness.
My solution is that these judgements track grammaticality: there is no separate
property of meaningfulness that these judgements respond to. I will term this
proposal an identification of meaningfulness and grammaticality because I am
claiming that there is really only the second property at work in the relevant
cases. I do not intend this as a criticism of other uses of the term ‘meaningful’
or to rule out other theories of what meaning is; my proposal is limited to the
context of the argument presented by Braun and Reimer.
It is legitimate to restrict the domain of things which are meaningful in this
way because that is the context created by Braun’s (and Reimer’s) presentation
of the argument. In that argument, sentences such as (1) are exhibited and a
judgement about them is reported. That judgement, that they are meaningful,
is then explained by attributing to those sentences another property, having a
propositional semantic content. I identify another property as an alternative
explanation. The property I pick, grammaticality, is a property of sentences just
like the one Braun identifies.6
6Things other than sentences might be grammatical e.g. noun phrases, although this is a
delicate issue (Ludlow 2005; Stainton 2005). All my view is committed to is that grammaticality
is a property of the sorts of things that are meaningful in the sense at issue in Braun’s argument.
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Grammaticality is not an absolute property of strings: it is relative to a grammar.
So, the best way to put the view is that speakers judge a string to be meaningful
when according to their own grammar it is grammatical. This view predicts
that two speakers with different grammars might differ on whether a string is
meaningful. This seems to me to be a correct prediction.
I will fill in the details of the proposed identification in section 3. For the moment
I want to stress the advantages that the identification offers to the Russellian
in the context of the debate over empty names. These advantages justify the
Russellian’s pursuit of this strategy, and make the details worth working out. The
first advantage is that it solves the Russellian’s problem with empty names. If
meaningfulness is grammaticality then content is not required for meaningfulness.
So, the no proposition view is tenable. Any property that doesn’t require content
would do some of the work that the Russellian needs doing. Grammaticality is a
particularly good choice because it is a property that philosophers of language
and linguists have a sophisticated and, crucially, independent grip on.
2.3 Truth
The standard Russellian view, which I endorse, is that propositions are the
primary bearers of truth, and that sentences are true or false because their
semantic contents are true or false. A sentence with no semantic content is
neither true nor false, so, on the no proposition view, sentences containing empty
names are neither true nor false. I will argue that this is the right result: given
Russellian principles we would expect these sentences to be neither true nor false.
This motivates the no proposition view against its main Russellian rival, the
gappy proposition view.
The gappy proposition view, defended by Braun and Nathan Salmon among
others, is that when a sentence contains an empty name its semantic content
is a Russellian structured proposition with a ‘gap’ where the name’s content
would be (Braun 1993, 2005; Salmon 1998).7 The content of (1) might then be
represented as 〈_,being-a-planet〉.
How do the two views compare? Defenders of the gappy proposition view take
different positions about the truth values of simple gappy propositions. One view
is that they are neither true nor false. This will carry the same commitments
about sentence truth as the no proposition view. So, the question of truth cannot
provide a reason to prefer this version of the gappy proposition view over the no
proposition view.
The alternative version of the gappy proposition view is that gappy propositions
are false, and therefore so are the sentences that express them. This is Braun’s
favoured version of the view. In Braun (1993, 459–60) he argues in favour of this
version of the gappy proposition view by appealing to negative existentials.8 He
7Braun uses ‘unfilled’ in the earlier paper and ‘gappy’ in the second; the notation I use for
gaps follows Braun’s second paper. The origins of the idea can be found in Kaplan (1989, 496,
footnote 23). Almog (1991); Salmon (1998); Everett (2003) report that David Kaplan was
responding to ideas of Saul Kripke’s which were presented in lectures eventually published in
Kripke (2013). The idea has been criticised in Everett (2003); Mousavian (2011).
8Braun (1993, 451–52) cites Russell (2010) and Quine (1980).
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argues that these sentences are true, and that this result cannot be accommodated
by the no proposition view. He then points out that it can be accommodated
by taking their contents to be the (true) negations of false gappy propositions
(Braun 1993, 464).
However, the status of negative existentials such as (3) is an extremely tricky
problem.
(3) Vulcan does not exist.
Many find it plausible that (3) is true, and if it is not true then the worry arises
that (4) should be instead.
(4) Vulcan exists.
But surely (4) isn’t true. However, (3) by itself is a rather strange sentence.
It seems to be saying of something, the referent of ‘Vulcan’, that that thing
doesn’t exist. But if it’s possible to refer to something in this way then it seems
reasonable to think that it must exist.9
It is just not clear that we ought to say, as philosophers pursuing the project
of understanding truth and existence, that negative existentials are true. The
real problem with negative existentials is not that they are intuitively true, a
judgement that arises for some other sentences containing empty names, but
that, taken at face value, they seem to say of something that it lacks a certain
property, namely existence. But, if this is right, then the thing they say lacks
existence must exist. Assigning a gappy proposition as the content of such
sentences does not remove this problem. The problem is that if they are true
it is hard to see how the name could be empty, and if it is not empty then the
negative existential would not be true. A theory on which negative existentials
are true but the names are empty is not a solution to this problem; the sense
of puzzlement remains. So the gappy proposition view is not really a solution
to the problem of negative existentials, there is therefore no reason for the no
proposition Russellian to give up their view.
I conclude from this that it is at least as plausible as any option currently on
offer to accept that neither (4) nor (3) have truth values because neither of them
have propositions as their contents.
Leaving aside negative existentials, I see no reason to prefer the claim that
sentences containing empty names are false rather than lacking truth value.
Someone who insists on falsity for a specific case or range of cases, fiction, for
example, would be better off with a view according to which the names are not
empty.10
Independently of the gappy proposition view, it might be objected that the no
9The strange properties of (3) might be taken as evidence that names like ‘Vulcan’ are not
in fact empty, and really denote nonexistent objects. This is the noneist view defended in
Priest (2005); the term is adopted from Routley (1980) and the view is related to but distinct
from that of Meinong (1960). Apart from such a view it seems that (3) raises problems for
everybody, it is not a special problem for Russellians; see e.g. Crane (2013, 71–75). This is
because the odd interaction between negation and ‘exists’ will arise even on views in which (3)
might have a proposition as its content.
10The same point would apply to someone who thought that some sentences containing
empty names are true.
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proposition view abandons bivalence. The no proposition Russellian should reply
that their view can accept bivalence for propositions, which are the primary
bearers of truth, and denies it merely for sentences. At this point the objector
might insist that while sentences are not the primary bearers of truth they must
be either true or false derivatively. This, however, is just what the no proposition
Russellian denies, and they do this on the basis of what by their lights are
plausible principles i.e. Mill and Russell.
Finally, I would like to make a general point in support of the no proposition
Russellian’s position on the truth values of sentences containing empty names.
The following two claims, which are not framed in terms particular to Russellians,
strike me as extremely plausible.
1. pa is Fq is true if and only if paq refers to something which has the property
pFq denotes.
2. pa is Fq is false if and only if paq refers to something which does not have
the property pFq denotes.
If 1 and 2 govern our understanding of sentence truth, then it will be very
reasonable to think that sentences containing empty names will not be true,
and nor will they be false. These claims about sentence truth don’t rely on
any Russellian claims. But the no proposition Russellian view (as well as the
no truth value gappy Russellian view) are in perfect accordance with them. I
conclude that the no proposition Russellian has no problems with truth, other
than those based on negative existentials. And there is no way to deal with
the problem of negative existentials that actually addresses what is puzzling
about them, therefore, they are not a good source of evidence against the no
proposition view.
In this section I have been concerned only with the metaphysical issue of whether
sentences containing empty names have truth values. I have not addressed the
question of whether speakers judge that they do, and, if so, what the explanation
for that might be. I will leave that issue for subsubsection 2.4.3.
2.4 Judgements
2.4.1 Methodology
Speakers’ judgements do matter, but they are not inviolable. Philosophers
of language frequently defend theories that contradict some judgements of
ordinary speakers. This is rarely taken as a knockdown objection, especially
when competing theories also have unintuitive consequences.
The more technical a notion is, the less relevant the judgements of ordinary
speakers are. Also, it is extremely important to be sure that the judgements that
speakers report are really about the question that is in dispute. In the remainder
of this subsection I will use these points to assess the evidential weight that we
should attach to judgements about meaningfulness, and about truth.
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2.4.2 Judgements about meaningfulness
How does the no proposition view do when confronted with speakers’ judgements,
bearing the two points above in mind? The first point suggests that we should
discount any judgements speakers report about the content of either words or
sentences. Content is a highly technical notion embedded in various philosophical
theories. One might as well try to directly elicit judgements about the relation-
ships between sentences and Russellian structured propositions. The exercise will
almost immediately become that of doing more philosophy of language, rather
than getting some sort of independent evidence to adjudicate the dispute.
Asking speakers for judgements about meaningfulness will be more illuminating.
But, it will become very important to be sure that the judgements being reported
are in fact relevant to the question at hand. For example, someone who claims
that (1) is meaningful might be reporting one of the following judgements (I
don’t claim this list is exhaustive):
1. There is something that is the meaning of the sentence.
2. The string is an acceptable sentence rather than word salad.
3. It is easy to imagine a situation in which the sentence is uttered and
thereby used to assert something.
1 would be evidence that Russellianism is counterintuitive. 2 would support
the view I am developing here because it would suggest that judgements about
meaningfulness are at least closely connected to judgements about acceptability,
which is in turn closely connected to grammaticality. 3 would be neutral in the
current context, because both the Russellian and their opponent can accept that
(1) might be used to assert something. The two positions will be committed to
different sorts of story about how this works, and the issue will turn on subtle
questions about the semantics–pragmatics distinction. So, even if speakers’
judgements do carry evidential weight in this debate it is unclear which view
they count in favour of.
It is also possible to elicit judgements about the meaning of individual words. It
is equally unclear which view such judgements will favour, however. The problem
with these judgements is that they could be taken to favour the view that ‘Vulcan’
isn’t empty just as reasonably as to favour the view that Russellianism is false.
Alternatively, it could also be that ordinary speakers have ‘Meinongian’ views,
as Reimer has proposed as part of an alternative solution to the problem of
empty names (Reimer 2001a). I think that we should be reluctant to attribute
metaphysical beliefs to speakers that we take to be false, and I suggest that it
is an advantage of the Russellian view I propose that speakers’ judgements are
tracking something true.
When a speaker reports that a sentence is meaningful they are reporting that
they find it acceptable. Acceptability is a consequence of judging a string to be
grammatical; this is the property that the judgements of meaningfulness track.
When a speaker reports that a word is meaningful they are reporting that it is a
word in common use (as well as being an acceptable phonetic string). I don’t
suggest that this is the only possible interpretation of the judgements speakers
make. Rather, I suggest that it is consistent with those judgements and a neat
fit with the no proposition Russellian view I favour.
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2.4.3 Judgements about truth
Judgements about truth will do better with the first point because, arguably,
truth is a less theoretical notion than either content or meaningfulness. At
least, the Russellian can concede that point. The problem for judgements about
truth is making sure that they pass the second test i.e. making sure that they
are tracking the question under discussion. As I have argued that sentences
containing empty names lack truth values, this response is one that I have to
make when facing alleged cases where speakers judge that they do.
Suppose a speaker says ‘that’s true’ when confronted with a sentence containing
an empty name such as (1), or, perhaps more plausibly, (3). The judgements that
has been elicited is a relevant judgements only if the following two conditions
are met. (i) The speaker also thinks that the name is empty; some speakers
will be (tacit) fictional realists or (tacit) Meinongians. (ii) The speaker really
does judge that the sentence is literally true rather than just used to convey
something true, either about a fiction or in some other way. It will be very hard
to be sure that the judgements elicited are relevant, and therefore very hard to
be sure that they are evidence against Russellianism.
This is an error theory: ordinary speakers, or philosophers, who think that
sentences containing empty names are true are making a mistake. For a range of
simple sentences this is not particularly controversial. Russellians will think this,
but so will Fregeans because the truth of such sentences depends on the referents
of their constituents. Proponents of gappy propositions will agree about the
simple cases, although they will claim that it is an advantage of their view that
some complex sentences containing empty names are true.
The gappy proposition view, whatever it entails about the truth values of gappy
propositions, violates some standardly reported judgements about the truth
values of some sentences. For example, some speakers think that some simple
sentences containing empty names are true. But no Russellian, neither a defender
of a no proposition or a gappy proposition view, can give anything but an error
theory about those judgements. I think that the right thing to do is to get truth
right, and accept an error theory about any judgements which conflict with the
right view of truth.
A final point to bear in mind is that the literature on empty names is full of
purported explanations of why speakers make the (false) judgements that they
do. Clapp (2009) proposes a presuppositional account. Everett (2013), drawing
on Walton (1990); Richard (2000), argues that speakers can use sentences that
are without truth value to convey truths about the world. Pragmatic accounts
of various sorts are discussed in Adams, Fuller, and Stecker (1993); Adams,
Fuller, and Stecker (1997); Adams and Stecker (1994); Taylor (2000); Everett
(2003); Adams and Dietrich (2004); Caplan (2006); Adams and Fuller (2007);
Wyatt (2007); Piccinini and Scott (2010); Mousavian (2015). Some of these
views posit a confusion between semantics and pragmatics to explain the error;
such confusions are certainly possible.
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3 Meaningfulness as grammaticality
3.1 The role of meaningfulness
In order to support the strategy for defending Russellianism sketched in section 2
it is now necessary to give an account of meaningfulness. The account must
meet the following criteria in order to support that strategy.
1. Plausibility: it should be reasonable to believe that the account is true
2. Connectedness: it should be that the property that meaningfulness is
identified with is suitably connected to commonsense conceptions of mean-
ingfulness
3. Intuitiveness: it should be reasonable to believe that speakers’ judgements
about meaningfulness are tracking the property that it is identified with
4. Veridicality: it should be reasonable to hold that speakers’ judgements are
largely true
If grammaticality can meet these requirements then it can be used to support the
argument in defence of Russellianism that I have been developing. I will argue
in this section that grammaticality does meet these requirements. I won’t argue
that no other property does, although I am not aware of any other candidates. I
will present the main argument in subsection 3.3 after saying what I mean by
‘grammar’ in subsection 3.2.
To briefly summarise what follows: I will claim that my account does well
on plausibility because the property of grammaticality is one posited by our
best science of language. My account does well on connectedness because
grammaticality and judgements about meaning are intimately related. My
account does well on intuitiveness because speakers judge grammatical sentences
to be meaningful, and vice versa. And, my account does well on veridicality
because speakers are correct when they judge grammatical sentences to be
meaningful, which they generally do.
3.2 Grammar
What notion of grammaticality does the argument require? In order to meet the
four criteria from subsection 3.1 the best approach is to borrow the notions of
both grammar and grammaticality from generative syntax.
The notion the Russellian needs is that of a grammar which is a formal system
for generating representations of sentences. Grammaticality can then be defined
in terms of the representations generated by the grammar. If the grammar
generates a representation for a string, then that string is grammatical (relative
to that grammar). Examples of grammars can be found in standard textbooks
such as Carnie (2013).
The Russellian will also need to claim that speakers’ judgements, for example
about meaningfulness, are responsive to this property. That some judgements of
speakers, those of acceptability, are responsive to formal properties of grammars
which are actually represented in the brain in a standard view in generative
syntax. The connection of formal grammars to the linguistic competences of
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speakers is a project strongly associated with the work of Chomsky; see e.g. the
papers collected in Chomsky (2000). The Russellian does not need to take a
stand on the details of this programme.
What the Russellian requires from this programme is that it is plausible that
when a speaker is confronted with sentences such as (1) and (5) part of the
machinery that facilitates their understanding is the generation of a syntactic
representation.
(5) Neptune is a planet.
This, crucially, does not happen when they engage in other activities. And, part
of this process can be correctly described as (tacit) knowledge on the part of
the speaker that the sentence they are confronting is grammatical. In other
words, judgements of grammaticality track real properties of the strings; this is
because judgements of grammaticality are based on the tacit representation of
these properties.
3.3 Why meaningfulness is grammaticality
What I have proposed, on the Russellian’s behalf, is a theoretical identification
between a technical notion (grammaticality) and a term of ‘folk linguistics’
(meaningfulness). I doubt if there could be a completely decisive argument for
such a conclusion. What can be given are reasons to think that the two notions
have a high degree of convergence. This will show that the identification is a
live option, which is what the Russellian needs to pursue the line of response to
the problem of empty names I have been advocating. I will present two pieces of
evidence.
Firstly, it seems that grammaticality and meaningfulness are at least coexten-
sional. Grammatical sentences, such as (1) and (5), are judged to be meaningful.
There are however limitations on the complexity of sentences that can be parsed,
for example (6).11
(6) The rat the cat the dog chased killed ate the malt.
This is grammatical but confusing and might be denied to be meaningful by
someone who was confused by it. What this shows is that recognising both
grammaticality and meaningfulness is not trivial. The specific ways that recog-
nising grammaticality is difficult might be explained by the way the human mind
implements its sentence parser (Phillips, Wagers, and Lau 2011). There are also
false positives: sentences that are prone to be judged to be grammatical when
they are not such as (7) (Phillips, Wagers, and Lau 2011).12
(7) More people have been to Russia than I have.
However, on reflection, (6) is accepted by speakers as grammatical and (7) is
rejected. Furthermore, once the question of grammaticality has been resolved
the standard judgement is that (6) is meaningful and (7) is not.
11The example is from Karlsson (2007), following an example from Miller and Chomsky
(1963).
12David Pereplyotchik first drew my attention to these cases; Pereplyotchik (2011) discusses
recent debates about the representation of syntactic structures.
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Ungrammatical ‘word salad’ such as (8) is not taken to be meaningful.
(8) planet a is Neptune
The possibility of both false positives and negatives for grammaticality is in fact
a point in favour of the Russellian view. It shows that there is something more
to grammaticality than mere acceptability judgements. Speakers are tracking,
albeit imperfectly, a substantial property of sentences.
At this point the objection might be raised that there are sentences that are not
grammatical, but which are meaningful in at least the sense that it is possible
to work out what the speaker meant in uttering them. This objection relies
on conflating the property we are interested in, meaningfulness, which is a
property of sentences, with something else that could usefully be called speaker
meaning. A speaker may intend to communicate something when they utter an
ungrammatical string and the audience may easily identify what that is. It does
not follow that the string is meaningful in the sense at issue.
Another sort of case that might be offered as a counterexample is that of ‘category
mistakes’ such as (9).
(9) Colourless green ideas sleep furiously.
Someone might hold that (9) is (i) grammatical, but (ii) meaningless. If so, there
would be a problem for my defence of no proposition Russellianism. However, I see
no reason why the Russellian is compelled to accept these claims. For example,
Ofra Magidor has argued at length that category mistakes are meaningful
(Magidor 2009, 2013, 2017), see also Camp (2004). Magidor’s view is that any
grammatical sentence is meaningful. Note also that, as Magidor (2009, 554,
footnote 6) points out, Chomsky (2015, 80–85, 159–76) at one stage claimed (9)
is not (fully) grammatical. Taking this line seems less plausible to me, but it is
another way that the Russellian could respond to the worry. In either case there
is a precedent for denying that these cases constitute counterexamples.
A further objection that could be raised here is that (9) gives rise to a distinct
problematic judgement by ordinary speakers. The alleged judgement is that (9)
is (i) grammatical and (ii) meaningless; even if that judgement is indeed false the
Russellian will need to explain why speakers make it. I claim that this judgement
is false, and I am happy to rely on the philosophical arguments in the works
cited above to defend that claim, but if speakers’ have a contrary judgement
then my view is committed to an error theory of their judgements. My response
is that speakers who report such judgements are in fact simply registering the
fact that such sentences are category mistakes. Such speakers have correctly
identified (9) as grammatical. This is the property that their judgements of
meaningfulness ordinarily track, however, when confronted by a category mistake
speakers correctly identify it as such. I need not endorse any theory of category
mistakes to make the present point: any such theory will allow that category
mistakes are in some sense anomalous. The view in Magidor (2013), for example,
is that category mistakes are a certain type of presupposition failure. Given that
category mistakes are anomalous in a particular way, it is to be expected that
speakers notice this fact. The way to test whether a speaker is really taking the
sentence to be meaningless in the sense relevant to Braun’s argument would be
to present a scenario of the sort that Magidor uses in her arguments that such
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sentences are meaningful. These scenarios are designed to make the category
mistake sentence appear true given a certain background. The background for
(10) might be:
John is a philosopher. He recently developed a new theory in the
philosophy of mathematics according to which numbers are coloured,
and the colour of the number two is green. For example, John may
hold some naturalist position according to which the number two is
the set of all pairs of physical objects in the word. In addition John
might hold that if most such pairs have a certain colour, then the
set — and therefore the corresponding number — have this colour.
(Magidor 2009, 567)
(10) The number two is green.
If a speaker reports (10) to be grammatical but not meaningful, but then in
response to the scenario accepts that against the background of the theory
described in the scenario (10) would be true, that speaker does not regard (10)
to be meaningless in the sense relevant to this paper.
Finally, there are good reasons to think that meaningfulness and grammaticality
are more closely connected than merely being coextensional properties. It is
not just a terminological point that e.g. Paul M. Pietroski use ‘meaningfulness’
(or ‘meaning’) for a property so closely connected to grammaticality (Pietroski
2003, 2005, 2008). Rather, there is supposed to be a deep link between being
grammatical and constraining what can be said. It is certainly right that these
constraints exist as the following example from Pietroski (2005, 257) illustrates.
(11) The millionaire called the senator from Texas.
The relevant point, which might sound obvious but is important, is that there
are two possible readings of (11): (i) The millionaire called the senator, and the
senator is from Texas; (ii) The millionaire called the senator, and the call was
from Texas. There is no reading: (iii) The millionaire called the senator, and
the millionaire is from Texas. But (iii) expresses a perfectly coherent thought;
the constraint here is imposed by grammar. A fact about sentence meaning is
then explained by a fact about which strings are generated by a grammar.
Here is the use that the Russellian can put an observation of this sort. Grammat-
icality and meaningfulness are coextensional. That does not show that they can
be identified. The observation about grammar constraining meaning suggests
that they should be, because it provides a point of contact between the property
of grammaticality and meaning. This is, of course, the orthodox view among
linguists influenced by Chomsky.
3.4 Meaning and character
One alternative view that I have heard suggested is that meaningfulness should
be identified with another property: having a (complex) character in something
like Kaplan’s sense (Kaplan 1989). This would allow for a response with the
same structure as mine: speakers are tracking the real property of having a
character. However, this view cannot be defended if the standard notion of
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character is what the proponents of such a view have in mind. This is because
the standard notion of character takes the character of a name such as ‘Vulcan’
or ‘Neptune’ to be a constant function from contexts to objects, or rather object:
the name’s referent.13 An empty name, lacking a content, will lack a referent
and therefore a character.
The lack of character for an empty name will lead to a lack of (complex) character
for the sentence as a whole. So, sentences containing empty names will not really
have the property that the proponent of the character no proposition view claims
that speakers are tracking. This view is therefore an error theory about these
speaker judgements. A view which appealed to something like Fregean sense
would be able to avoid this problem for the character view, but this view would
no longer be Russellian.
A second problem for the character based view is that it will have to overcome
the arguments in King and Stanley (2005) against treating the meanings of
sentences as complex characters. I find these arguments convincing.
4 Conclusion
I have presented the problem of empty names as it applies to Russellianism. I
have argued that the Russellian can and should adopt a no proposition view
in response to the problem. Sentences containing empty names are meaningful
because they are grammatical, but they do not have contents.
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